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Children’s conceptions of dreams are an important component of their develop- 
ing understanding of the mind. Although there is much that even adults do not 
understand about the nature of dreams, most adults in Western society believe 
that: Dream entities are not real in the sense that they are nonphysical; they are 
private in the sense that they are not available to public perception, and are not 
directly shared with other dreamers; and, dreams are typically fictional in content. 
Thus, children in our society must confront several dualisms with respect to 
dreams, such as their physical versus nonphysical, perceptually-public versus per- 
ceptually-private, and shared versus individuated nature. Thirty-two children, 
aged 3- and 4-years-old, were told stories about children who were dreaming 
about an object, playing with an object, or looking at a photograph of an object, 
and then were asked questions about the status of these entities with regard to 
these three dualisms. All children judged dream entities, photographs, and phys- 
ical objects to be appropriately different in terms of physical versus nonphysical 
properties and in terms of perceptually-public versus private status. They also 
understood the fictional nature of dreams. However, whereas most 4-year-olds 
understood that dreams are individuated, many 3-year-olds believed that dreams 
are directly shared by more than one person. These findings contrast with earlier 
research characterizing children’s understanding of dreams as realistic. We recon- 
cile these contrasting findings by discussing methodological differences, and we 
situate our findings regarding children’s understanding of dreams within the con- 
text of contemporary research on children’s theory of mind. 
Children’s conceptions of dreams are a component of their developing under- 
standing of the mind, and have traditionally been used as an index of this more 
general understanding. Dreams are salient mental experiences for most adults, 
and may be especially so for young children. Certainly bad dreams or nightmares 
are a commonly reported childhood experience even among preschoolers. The 
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traditional view of young children, however, is that they arc conceptually con- 
fused or ignorant about the subjective nature of dreams. This characterization 
was proposed by Piaget ( 1929). and reiterated by Laurendeau and Pinard ( 1962). 
and more recently by Broughton (1978), among others. These researchers used 
children’s concepts of dreams specifically as important evidence about their 
conception of the mind in general. Thus, Piaget claimed that preschool children 
are realists. that is, they believe that dreams (and other mental phenomena) are 
external and objective phenomena, and they do not distinguish dream events and 
entities from objective perceptual events and objects. As he said, “the child is a 
realist and a realist because he has not yet grasped the distinction between subject 
and object and the internal nature of thought. Obviously, therefore, he will be 
confronted by grave difficulties when he attempts to explain the most subjective 
of all phenomena-dreams” (Piaget, 1929, p. 88). Piaget claimed that children 
achieve a mentalistic understanding of dreams and other mental states beginning 
only at about age six or seven and only fully understand their nonphysical, 
private, internal nature by age 12. 
Recent studies of children’s understanding of the mind paint a very ditferent 
picture of young children’s understanding of mental states and mental entities. 
Preschool children have been shown to be knowledgeable about beliefs and 
desires (e.g., Wellman & Bartsch, 1988; Wimmer & Pemcr, 1983). knowledge 
(e.g., Pillow, 1989; Wimmer, Hogrefe. & Pemer, 1988), thoughts and mental 
images (Estes, Wellman. & Woolley. 1989; Wellman & Estes, 1986). and pre- 
tense (e.g., Leslie, 1987; 1988). Overall, this research has found that young 
children between the ages of 3 and 5 acquire a sensible, albeit initial, understand- 
ing of the nature of their own and others’ minds. 
What might account for this discrepancy between traditional findings and 
interpretations and the emerging contemporary ones’? One possible explanation is 
that the focal topic has shifted across the years: Early investigations, such as 
those of Piaget (1929) and Laurendeau and Pinard (1962), focused largely on 
children’s understanding of dreams; recent studies focus on children’s under- 
standing of a broader spectrum of mental states such as knowledge, imagination, 
desires, and pretense, but interestingly, very little on dreams. One possibility 
therefore is that children’s conceptions of dreams may lag behind their concep- 
tions of these other sorts of mental states. 
Indeed, there are both empirical and conceptual reasons to believe that dreams 
may be a specially troubling topic for children. Empirically, in a longitudinal 
study of children’s dreams, Foulkes (1982) reports that dreams were relatively 
rare in his 3- to Syear-old subjects. When awakened from REM sleep, these 
young children rarely reported any dream content. Regardless of whether these 
children really did not dream, or rather, actually had dreams that they were 
unable to remember or articulate, this research suggests that the experience of 
thinking about dreams, even one’s own dreams, may not be a common or simple 
one for young children. Conceptually, consider a crude division of representa- 
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tional mental states into those that are reality-oriented (e.g., knowledge and 
percepts) and those that are decidedly fictional (e.g., imagination). Percepts and 
knowledge, on the one hand, are cases in which there is often a fairly straightfor- 
ward relationship between the world and the mind. On the other hand, fictional 
imaginings do not involve such a straightforward relationship between world and 
mind. 1 can see an empty chair, know that it is empty, and yet imagine that 
someone is sitting in it. Where do dreams fit into this dichotomy? At times, 
dreams can seem quite real when they are occurring, and may seem to mimic our 
perceptual contact with the physical world, even replaying perceptual experi- 
ences. However, at other times they seem to be entirely fantasy-driven, and we 
are mystified as to their origin. Moreover, dreams seem to come to us involun- 
tarily, while we are in a very special state, namely sleeping. In short, in com- 
parison to other mental entities and states, dreams may represent a confusing 
case, and may be especially difficult for children to understand. 
An alternative explanation for the discrepancy between the older and the 
newer findings is that methods have evolved. There are two reasons to suspect 
that earlier studies, based more on openended clinical interviews, may not have 
adequately captured young children’s conceptions. First, in studies like Piaget’s. 
the questions asked of children seem imprecise and even misleading. For exam- 
ple, in replicating Piaget, Laurendeau and Pinard (1962) asked, “Where are 
dreams made; where do they come from?” and “When you dream that you are 
playing in the street. where is your dream ?” Questions such as these are unclear 
and seem to presuppose that dreams actually are substantial entities, made of 
something, and occupying some definite physical location. Similarly, in Shweder 
and Levine’s (1975) study of dream concepts in the Hausa tribe of Nigeria, 
children were asked to describe one of their dreams, and then asked such ques- 
tions as: (a) Did that (described action or event) really happen?, and (b) Was the 
dream inside your room or inside you? These sorts of questions are ambiguous or 
even anomalous. A “yes” response to the first question was taken by Shweder 
and Levine to mean that the child was a realist. However, a child could answer 
yes to that question because he or she actually dreamed about a real object or 
event (as opposed to a fantastical one). The second question also is confusing 
because neither answer is literally correct; in common conception dreams do not 
really happen in any particular place-as mental events they are not literally 
spatially localizable. Requiring children to choose between these two alternatives 
may provide misleading infomlation about their conceptions. 
Second, studies like these seem to include only half the necessary design. 
Children were asked questions only about the mental phenomena of interest, for 
example, dreams. To detemline whether children confuse such mental phenomena 
with physical ones requires asking them about both and comparing their responses. 
More recent studies of children’s understanding of mental phenomena have used 
precise yes/no judgments of mental entities or events in direct contrast with 
various foils. Thus, for example, children may be asked a set of differentiating 
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questions about items such as a thought about a dog, a real dog, a shadow of a 
dog, and a photograph of a dog (Estes et al., 1989; Wellman & Estcs, 1986). This 
sort of procedure allows investigators to test whether children’s answers differ 
appropriately across mental and nonmental entities, and hence, whether children 
conceptually distinguish such items. 
Our goal in the present study was to apply improved methods for investigating 
children’s understanding of the mind to their understanding of dreams specifical- 
ly. Because of the salient and provocative nature of dreams. children’s under- 
standing of dreams is an intriguing topic. What might children know about 
dreams’? Even adults in our society do not typically claim to know exactly where 
dreams come from, or what they might mean if anything. Moreover, different 
cultures interpret the origins and meanings of dreams very ditferently (Kohlberg, 
1969; Shweder & Levine, 1975). However, there are some beliefs about dreams 
that can safely be said to be held by the majority of adults within Western society; 
we use these beliefs as a starting point for our own investigation. Specifically, 
adults know that dream entities (e.g., a dream of a dog) like all mental entities 
(e.g., a thought about a dog) differ in several ways from concrete physical 
objects (e.g., a dog). For most Western adults dream entities are nonphysical, 
that is, not available to the dreamer’s senses or to action in the same way as real 
physical objects. Additionally, dreams are private occurrences, both in the sense 
that they are not available to public perception, and in the sense that they are not 
shared with other dreamers, that is they are individuated. Finally. unlike other 
physical entities that may lack certain behavioral-sensory properties (e.g., shad- 
ows), dreams often have no real-world referent or origin. that is, they can be 
completely fictional. 
In coming to a mature understanding of dreams, children must determine that 
dream entities are nonphysical, perceptually private and individuated, and addi- 
tionally that dream contents can be fictional. Young children’s earliest concep- 
tions of dreams may lack any similarity to those of adults on any of these 
dimensions. For example, children might first think that dream entities and 
events are both physical and public, as portrayed by the tern1 “realism.” Alter- 
natively, children’s conceptions may be similar to those of adults in some re- 
spects, but different in others. For example, they might first think that dreams are 
mental and fictional, as do adults, but at the same time believe that they are 
shared communally by dreamers, that is, they might believe everyone has the 
same dreams. Research by Shweder and Levine (1975) lends some credence to 
such an intriguing possibility. They claim that some children of the Hausa tribe in 
Nigeria go through a period in which they believe dreams to be shared fantasies 
experienced in common by sleeping partners. 
In this study we investigate children’s developing conceptions of dreams. In 
particular we have assessed when children understand the three primary distinc- 
tions discussed above: physical versus nonphysical, perceptually-public versus 
private, and shared versus individuated. In addition, we have probed children’s 
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understanding of both the potentially fictional nature of dream contents and the 
fact that dreams are not spatially localizable. 
METHOD 
Subjects 
Thirty-two children participated; sixteen 3-year-olds (A4 = 3;7, range = 3;1- 
3;l I) and sixteen 4-year-olds (M = 4;4, range = 4;0-4;l I). There were 17 boys 
and I5 girls, all from a preschool program serving an ethnically mixed but 
predominantly white middle-class clientele in a small Midwestern city. Two 3- 
year-olds were dropped from the analysis because they answered yes to every 
question and one 4-year-old was dropped because she was unwilling to complete 
the task. This resulted in a final sample of fourteen 3-year-olds (M = 3;7, range 
= 3;1-3;l 1) and fifteen 4-year-olds (M = 4;5, range = 4;0-4;ll). 
Tasks 
The basic design involves asking a series of similar questions about a set of 
contrasting items, an item by question design, where the pattern of answers 
across items reveals children’s conceptions. We used four items-Physical Ob- 
ject, Photograph, Dream (one character dreaming), and Both Dream (two charac- 
ters dreaming)-embedded in short stories. There were two instances of each 
item. The following list gives an example of each type of item. 
1. Physical Object: “Here’s Sarah. It’s a sunny day. Right now Sarah’s outside 
and she’s riding her bike.” 
2. Photograph: “This is Sam. One time when Sam went to the circus he had his 
camera and he took a picture of a funny clown. Right now Sam’s in his 
room, and he’s looking at the picture of the clown.” 
3. Dream: “Here’s Jimmy. His favorite toy is a ball. Right now Jimmy’s asleep 
and he’s dreaming about a ball.” 
4. Both Dream: “Here’s Steve. Here’s his sister Beth. They sleep in the same 
bedroom. They both are asleep and they’re both dreaming. Steve’s dreaming 
about a fish.” 
The core of our design focuses on children’s contrasting conceptions of three 
of the items: Physical Object, Photograph, and Dream. As shown in the top of 
Figure I (p. 370), three key questions were asked for each of these items: 
(a) whether the focal story character could see the item with his or her eyes (See 
question), (b) if someone else came into the room, whether they could see the item 
with their eyes (Other See question), and (c) whether the focal character could act 
upon the item in a specific way (Action question). With respect to these items and 
features we reasoned that correct responding should look essentially like the ideal 
pattern depicted at the top of the figure. Correct responding should reflect an 
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Figure 1. Ideal and observed patterns of responses to questions about behavioral- 
sensory properties. 
understanding of the physical and perceptually-public nature of concrete physical 
entities and objects in photographs, and, in contrast, the nonphysical and private 
nature of dreams. Additionally, correct responding should reflect the knowledge 
that whereas concrete physical objects are directly tangible, objects in pho- 
tographs and entities in dreams are not. These items and questions could detect 
several alternative conceptions. For example, if children incorrectly believed 
dream entities to be like concrete physical objects, they would answer the ques- 
tions for the physical object and the dream items similarly. If children incorrectly 
believed dream entities to be like photographs or pictures displayed in their rooms 
(as Piaget claimed), the patterns across the three questions for dreams and 
photographs would be identical, essentially the one depicted in Figure I for 
photographs. Only if children correctly understood the behavioral-sensory proper- 
ties of each of the items would their responses approximate the ideal pattern. 
To test children’s beliefs about the sharable versus individuated nature of 
dreams we included the Both Dream item, where two children are asleep and 
dreaming, with one child’s dream contents specified in the story. After they were 
presented with this scenario children were asked the See and Other See questions 
described above, followed by two questions concerning sharability versus indi- 
viduation. The target question asked whether another person who was sleeping in 
the same room would dream about that exact same object. Answers here were 
probed further by a follow-up question. If children responded “yes” to the target 
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question, they were then asked whether two people sleeping in the same room 
always dreamed about the same thing. If they responded “no” to the target 
question they were asked if there was any way two people could have the same 
dream at the same time. 
At the end of each session we probed children’s understanding of the poten- 
tially fictional nature of dreams. To do this we asked children about two types of 
entities, real entities (a ball that bounces and an ant crawling on the ground) and 
fictional entities (a ball that sings and an ant riding a bicycle). For each item we 
asked (a) whether the child had ever seen one, (b) whether it existed, (c) whether 
the child could think about one, and (d) whether the child could dream about one. 
The graph at the top of Figure 2 depicts what we consider to be the ideal pattern 
of responses to these questions, namely that only the real entities really exist and 
can be seen but that both sorts can be thought or dreamed of. Children’s re- 
sponses were yes or no to the various questions, and they were asked to explain 
their answers. 
Finally, prior studies have found that children, like adults, often claim that 
thoughts are in the head (Estes et al., 1989; Johnson & Wellman, 1982), and in 
pilot testing we found that some children explained that the reason dreams were 
not perceptible with one’s eyes was because dream entities were inside the head. 
Adults, of course, typically say that mental entities are in the head or in the mind 
in a figurative sense, without meaning that dreams are spatial objects liter- 
ally contained in the body or head. Children could be responding similarly, or 
Figure 2. Ideal and observed patterns of responses to questions about real and 
fictional entities. 
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potentially could be evidencing a misconception of dreams as literally inside the 
body, in the same way that food once eaten is inside the stomach. As a check on 
this possibility therefore, on the Dream item, we asked children whether dream 
entities were inside the dreamer. This question is admittedly ambiguous, how- 
ever if children responded positively we then asked whether the dream entity was 
literally inside the dreamer in the sense that it could be removed. Affirmative 
responses to this second focal question would clearly indicate a realistic miscon- 
ception of dreams as internal entities. 
Procedure 
Children were seen individually in a quiet room at their preschool. Stories were 
presented by an experimenter who had spent considerable time in the children’s 
classroom and hence was familiar to the children. 
The two instances of each of the four items were presented orally in the form 
of short stories, each two to three sentences long (see list of examples, p. 369). 
Each story was accompanied by a simple line drawing of a face of either one or 
two children. The objects in the stories were not depicted in the drawings. After 
each story children were asked the questions described above. There were two 
different orders of presentation. In both orders, one of the two Physical Object 
items was presented first to orient the children, then followed by a Dream item. 
An instance of the two remaining items followed, but in one presentation order 
the Both Dream item came first and in the other the Photograph item came first. 
Children received one instance of each type of item in one of these orders and 
then the order was repeated for the second set of instances. After most of the 
questions children were asked to explain their answers. 
RESULTS 
Perceptibility and Publicness 
Consider first the core of the design, children’s understanding of the percep- 
tibility and publicness of the three items shown in Figure I. The graphs at the 
bottom of that figure present the observed patterns of responses, in comparison to 
the hypothetical-ideal pattern. Note that, despite some differences in overall level 
of response, both age groups conform to the ideal pattern. Both 3- and 4-year- 
olds judged concrete physical objects and objects in photographs differently from 
dream entities. 
Statistical analyses support this graphical depiction. Preliminary analyses re- 
vealed no effects of sex or presentation order of the items. A 2(Age) X 3(Item) X 
3(Question) repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) revealed signifi- 
cant main effects of item, F(2, 54) = 107.14, p < .OOl, and question, F(2, 54) 
= 17.42, p < .OOl , but not of age. The main effect of item was subsumed under 
an item X age interaction, F(2, 54) = 14.28, p < .OOl, reflecting the difference 
in overall level of response for the two age groups as is apparent in the figure. 
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Likewise, the main effect of question was also subsumed under a question X age 
interaction, F(2, 54) = 3.40, p < .OS. The most critical finding, however, was 
the significant interaction between item and question, F(4, 108) = 45.42, p < 
.OOl , indicating that children answered the three questions appropriately differ- 
ently depending upon the item queried. Importantly, the three-way interaction 
between item, question, and age was not significant, indicating that 3- and 4- 
year-olds did not differ in terms of their conformity to the ideal pattern. 
Post hoc Scheffe tests (JJ < .05) further support these graphical conclusions. 
Children of both age groups more often reported that the physical object and the 
photograph could be seen (by oneself or another) than could a dream entity. 
Critically for our design, children of both ages treated objects in photographs and 
dream entities similarly on the action question. That is, they responded equally 
often that actions suitable to the referents themselves could not be performed on 
the photographic entities or the dream entities. 
Children’s explanations further clarify their understanding of these distinc- 
tions. Each child gave at least two explanations for their answers to these ques- 
tions about each type of item. These explanations were grouped into four main 
categories: (a) physical/moral (e.g., “Cause it pounds down there” or “Because 
only grown-ups should”), (b) mental, (e.g., “Cause it’s only pretend” or “Cause 
it’s only in her dream”), (c) location (e.g., “Because it’s on the wall” or “It’s in 
the picture”), and (d) reality status (e.g., “Because it’s real”). These four catego- 
ries captured 74% of 3-year-olds’ and 90% of 4-year-olds’ explanations. The 
remainder fell into a residual category made up of “I don’t know,” “just be- 
cause” and other similar expressions. All of the children’s explanations were 
coded by two independent coders. Inter-coder reliability (calculated as agree- 
ments divided by agreements plus disagreements) was 97%. 
The frequency of these four most prevalent types of explanation for each age 
group on each of the types of items is presented in Figure 3 ( p. 374) in the form 
of star graphs. Each of the four arms of each star corresponds to one category of 
explanation. Plotted along each arm is the percentage of total explanations that 
fell into each particular category. The plots along each arm are then connected to 
form a graphical figure. 
Examination of these star graphs reveals that both 3- and 4-year-olds used 
distinctly different patterns of explanation for the three item types. In discussing 
concrete physical items children of both ages most often referred to physical 
properties. In contrast to these physical explanations, dream entity questions 
elicited primarily mental explanations in 3-year-olds, and mental and reality 
status explanations in 4-year-olds. When discussing photographs, 3-year-olds’ 
explanations primarily referred to location (e.g., “because it’s on the picture”), 
and 4-year-olds’ explanations referred to both location and reality status. Where- 
as 4-year-olds rarely responded with “don’t know” or “just because,” 26% of 3- 
year-olds’ explanations were of this sort. Critically however, 3-year-olds re- 
sponded with these unsure responses equally across the three item types. 
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Figure 3. Star graphs of children’s esplanations. 
Fictional Nature of Dream Contents 
From these data it seems that children conceive of dreams as mental entities. 
Thus the pattern of responses parallels that found for thoughts and memories 
(Wellman & Estes. 1986) and for mental images (Estes et al., 1989). Most adults 
however consider dreams to be more fantasy-like or fictional than memories or 
mental images of objects. although we understand that dreams can potentially be 
about real-life objects and events, too. The questions about real and fictional 
entities depicted in Figure 2 probed children’s understanding of the potentially 
fictional nature of dream contents. The ideal pattern-an understanding that 
mental states like thoughts and dreams can encompass fictional items that seeing 
cannot-is presented at the top of Figure 2, and the observed patterns of re- 
sponse are presented at the bottom. Note the similarity in basic form of the 
responses for 3- and 4-year-olds: both age groups conform in essence to the ideal 
pattern. Overall, children were 93% correct on the questions about whether the 
real and fictional objects existed, and were 91% correct on whether they had seen 
each type of object. Thus, both 3- and 4-year-olds knew which of the objects 
were real and which were fictional. The critical question then becomes whether 
children also understand that both fictional and real objects can occur in their 
dreams. Both 3- and 4-year-olds were equally correct on the questions about 
whether they could dream about a fantasy object and whether they could dream 
about a real object (64% and 7 1% respectively for 3-year-olds, and 90% and 87% 
for 4-year-olds). A 2(Entity: Fictional, Real) X 2(Question: Exist, Dream) 
ANOVA confirmed this finding. There were significant main effects of both 
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entity and question. both subsumed under the Entity X Question interaction as 
shown in Figure 2, F(1, 27) = 120.13. p < .OOl. 
These data, showing that children understand that dream entities are not only 
intangible and perceptually private, but also potentially fictional. make it un- 
likely that children conceive of them as real objects occupying physical space. It 
remains remotely possible, however, that at times children conceive of some 
dream entities as something like physical objects inside the body-something 
like swallowed food-and hence, something that could be seen once removed. 
We asked children therefore whether the dream entity was inside the dreamer and 
more focally, if so. whether it could be removed. Of 3-year-olds, 71% said that 
the dream entity was not inside the character. Of the 29% who said that it was 
inside. 100% said that it was not something that could be taken out. Of the 4- 
year-olds, 4 1% said that a dream entity was not inside a person and 59% said that 
it was. However, of the 4-year-olds claiming that a dream entity was inside the 
character, 88% said that it was not something that could be removed. In conjunc- 
tion with children’s other responses we take these data to indicate little, if any, 
conception of dreams as literally internal objects. coupled with an increasing 
tendency with age to adopt the adult-like figurative expression that dreams are 
“inside” the dreamer. 
Individuation versus Sharability 
The data thus far show that these children’s conceptions parallel those of Western 
adults in conceiving of dreams as distinctly mental experiences that are not 
necessarily connected to reality in status. content. or location; something we can 
loosely term mental fantasies. The question remains however whether children 
conceive of dreams as private fantasies, as adults do, or as shared fantasies, in 
which dreaming individuals experience the same dream content. We addressed 
this issue with the Both Dream item. First we asked, in a target question, whether 
another character would be dreaming about the object in the focal character’s 
dream. Based on their responses to the two instances of this target question, 
children were initially classified as having a shared fantasy conception (when a 
child answered yes to both instances of this question), or a private fantasy 
conception (when a child answered no to both instances), or as being incon- 
sistent. According to this initial classification, the predominant conception of 
4-year-olds was that dreams are nonshared or individuated. Ten of fifteen 4-year- 
olds judged that two people would not share the same dream on both instances of 
this question. Two 4-year-olds believed that dreams were shared fantasies, con- 
sistently judging that dreams were shared between dreamers, and three 4-year- 
olds were inconsistent. In contrast, six 3-year-olds evidenced a consistent shared- 
fantasy conception. Only three of the fourteen 3-year-olds held the private fan- 
tasy conception, and the five remaining 3-year-olds were inconsistent across item 
instances. Thus. this initial coding revealed that more 3-year-olds held the shared 
fantasy conception than the private fantasy conception, whereas the reverse was 
true for 4-year-olds-x’(l) = 5.5, p < .02. 
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This scoring system, based only on children’s responses to the target question, 
conceals some indications that shared fantasy notions were more widespread and 
more variable. Hence we developed a more inclusive classification system based 
not only on yes/no judgments on the target question, but including responses to 
the follow-up question, and the content of children’s explanations. From these 
data we grouped children into three categories: confident shared fantasy, confi- 
dent private fantasy, and transitional. To be classified as having a confident 
shared-fantasy conception children had to answer affirmatively across both in- 
stances of the target question that two children sleeping in the same room would 
be dreaming about the same thing, respond positively to the follow-up questions 
that two people sleeping in the same room always dream about the same thing, 
and give justifications that were consistent with their responses to these ques- 
tions. Seven children, five 3-year-olds and two 4-year-olds, were classified as 
being confident about their shared fantasy conception. To be classified as having 
a confident private-fantasy conception, children had to respond negatively to both 
instances of the target question and the follow-up question and provide justifica- 
tions that were consistent with their responses. Twelve children, ten 4-year-olds 
and three 3-year-olds were classified as being confident in their private-fantasy 
conception. The differences between these two types of conceptions is made even 
clearer by children’s actual explanations, which can be seen in the Appendix. 
Children who were classified as transitional either responded inconsistently 
across instances of the target question, answered positively to the target question 
and negatively to the follow-up question, or provided justifications that were 
inconsistent with their responses to the questions. Nine children were classified 
as transitional, six 3-year-olds, and three 4-year-olds. These nine children’s 
patterns of answers and explanations revealed what appeared to be a qualified 
acceptance of the nature of shareability, not simply inconsistent responding. In 
particular, seven of the nine indicated in their explanations that there were certain 
conditions that governed whether or not two people would be having the same 
dream. For example, one child said that two people have to be in the same bed to 
have the same dream, another that only siblings can have the same dream, and 
two responded that it depended upon whether the two people wanted to dream the 
same thing or not (see Appendix). 
Overall, with this refined coding system, whereas the majority of 4-year-olds 
(67%) held the private-fantasy conception, the majority of 3-year-olds (79%) 
either held the shared-fantasy conception or were classified as transitional- 
x2( 1) = 6.0. p < .02. Thus it appears that there may be considerable develop- 
ment between the ages of three and four in children’s understanding of the 
individuation of dreams. r 
t As we had a fairly continuous distribution of ages between 3 and 4 in our sample, we expected 
that we might find a gradual transition between 3 and 4 from a shared- to a private-fantasy concep- 
tion. Analyses of the age distributions within each conception however revealed no significant 
patterns. For example, the mean ages for 3-year-olds holding the shared-fantasy conception and for 
those holding the private-fantasy conception were equal (3;8), and for the 3-year-olds classified as 
transitional the mean age was 3;7. 
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These data on young children’s understanding of dreams provide evidence of an 
early sophistication in understanding of a complex mental phenomenon. Arriving 
at a mature understanding of the nature of dreams in our society requires confron- 
tation with several dualisms-physical-nonphysical, public-private, fictional- 
factual, and shared-individuated. Children as young as 3 and 4 years of age in 
these tasks have shown a sensible understanding of these dualisms as they apply 
to three distinct entities-dream entities, concrete physical objects, and 
photographs. 
Regarding the first two dualisms. physical-nonphysical and publicly percep- 
tible-private, young children appropriately distinguished dreams from concrete 
physical objects as nonphysical and private. This contradicts the traditional view 
of young children as realists, and supports and extends the more recent findings 
of Wcllman and Estes (1986). Additionally, and requiring an even more sophisti- 
cated understanding of the nature of dreams, these children clearly distinguished 
between dream entities and objects in photographs. Children understood that 
photographs are similar to dreams in the inaccessibility of their depicted refer- 
ents, and at the same time understood that they differ from dreams in terms of 
visual perceptibility both for self and for others. This finding strengthens the 
claim made in Estes et al. (1989) that children are not “subtle realists.” confus- 
ing mental entities with close imposters, in this case, photographs. 
An essential feature of mental contents is that they can be both relatively 
accurate reflections of objects in the world, and can also be completely fictional 
and have no real-world referent. The capacity to imagine something we have 
never seen or heard of is a powerful property of the mind. We found in this study 
that by 3 and 4 years of age. children understand this property of the mind; they 
know that we can both think and dream of nonexistent fictional things. 
We also investigated the possibility that children might believe that dream 
entities are spatially located inside the dreamer, and are actually something like 
swallowed food or even an internal organ. a heart or a kidney for example. This 
type of conception characterizes Laurendeau and Pinard’s substage of mitigated 
realism in which children believe dreams are internal and made of blood or 
bones. Most of our subjects. although they agreed that dreams are not external 
experiences, denied that they were literally spatially located inside the dreamer. 
Children appeared to understand that although dreams may be said to be inside a 
person rather than outside, they are not spatially located at any particular place in 
any more than a figurative sense. 
Children’s ability to make these distinctions supports the hypothesis that 
improved methods are responsible for the discrepancy between traditional re- 
search findings and more contemporary ones. Complementarily, these findings 
cast doubt on the proposal that children’s conceptions of the mental nature of 
dreams lag behind their understanding of other mental states. 
These are our primary conclusions. More tentatively, but strikingly. our find- 
ings suggest an early misconception and document age differences in understand- 
ing of the individuated nature of dreams. According to Shweder and Levine 
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(1975), some Hausa children believe that dreams are shared between sleeping 
individuals. Using improved methods. we also found that some children con- 
ceive of dreams as shared fantasies. Whereas most 4-year-olds believed, as 
adults do, that dreams are private fantasies, a substantial number of 3-year-olds 
exhibited this misconception. Although these children understand that dreams 
are not publicly perceptible in the sense that others can see them as external 
physical events, they believe that dreams are shared between sleeping minds. 
This seems a plausible misconception if children are building up a conception of 
dreams, in part, by examination of their own dream experiences. Because dreams 
occur while we are asleep, this sort of misconception would be less susceptible to 
active disconfirmation than would be. for example, the misconception that we all 
share the same percepts or beliefs. Moreover, a dream as a private experience is 
shared in one sense; most people have dreams generally, although not identical 
dreams about identical entities. We can also share the content of our dreams with 
others by talking to them. Additionally, young children may try to understand 
dreams by likening them to other sorts of fictional mental states, for example, 
pretense and imagination. Children’s beliefs in shared dreams thus may arise by 
comparison to their experiences of shared pretense, for example, or to the experi- 
ence of shared fantasy in hearing a fictional story. The range of conviction that 
we found, as evidenced by both inconsistency in responding and elaborations 
given in justifications of responses, suggests that preschoolers are still working 
out exactly what the sharable nature of dreams is. 
Note that a firm shared-fantasy conception, although quite prevalent, does not 
characterize even the majority of 3-year-olds. Shweder and Levine hypothesize 
that adoption of a shared-fantasy conception depends upon sleeping arrange- 
ments. According to Shweder and Levine’s proposal, although children who 
sleep alone may understand that dreams are nonphysical and internal events, they 
are more likely to develop and retain a belief that dream experiences are shared 
by all dreamers. For example, they may never have had the experience of waking 
up from a frightening, agitating dream and finding their sleeping partner peace- 
fully asleep. To investigate the possibility that conceptions of dreams are linked 
to sleeping arrangements we collected data on whether each child in our study 
slept alone or with another person. We found that children who slept alone had 
the same distribution of conceptions as children who slept with others; specifical- 
ly, in contrast to Shweder and Levine’s proposal, they were not more likely to 
conceive of dreams as shared fantasies. Thus, although children’s beliefs did 
seem to vary in this regard, no direct information as to their origins were evident 
in these data. 
In attempting to chart the development of children’s understanding of mental 
states, it is important to document when beliefs are neither uniformly held by 
children nor simple reflections of adult beliefs. Misconceptions are often a result 
of active attempts to understand the mind from a somewhat limited data base, 
and their presence suggests that children are actively trying to make sense of this 
complex domain. Our findings on children’s understanding of dreams thus pro- 
Conceptions of Dreams 379 
vide important information, and join a growing body of research on this topic. 
Telling misconceptions have also been found in young children’s understanding 
of imagination (e.g., Woolley & Wellman, in press), and in their understanding 
of reality-oriented mental states such as false beliefs (e.g., Wimmer & Pemer, 
1983) and perceptual illusions (e.g., Flavell, 1988). These sorts of plausible, 
nonuniform misconceptions of the mind are an especially important source of 
information as to the character of young children’s developing understanding. 
To reiterate, however, our primary conclusion is that for children in our 
society, early understanding of dreams is largely sensible, and is of an internal 
private mental state. Any errors in conception take place against a coherent 
mentalistic understanding of the mind generally, and of dreams specially as one 
sort of mental state among others. 
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APPENDIX 
Sample Explanations: Responses to Follow-up Questions 
Target Question. “Now that Johnny is dreaming about a fish, is Timmy 
dreaming about that fish too?” 
Follow-up. If yes, “If two people are sleeping in the same room, are they 
always dreaming about the same thing’?” If no, “Is there any way two people can 
have the same dream at the same time’?” 
Confident Shared Fantasy 
PS (3; 11) “1 think that when people sleep in the same room they dream about the 
same thing.” 
NH (3;7) “Like me and my brother Jeff, we sleep in the same room.” (E: Do 
you always have the same dream’?) “Yup, we dream about our cat.” (E: You 
always have the same dream’?) “Yup.” 
Confident Private Fantasy 
BB (3;8) “Because most of us have different dreams” and “Well, because my 
sister dreams about dolls and I don’t.” 
BM (3;5) “Because they don’t know that the other one’s thinking about that 
one and the other one doesn’t know he’s thinking about that one.” 
TL (4;4) “Cause urn, if someone doesn’t tell you they’re dreaming about a 
fish or something you can’t dream about it.” 
DW (4;4) “Because . . . because they aren’t the same people.” 
Transitional 
JB (3;lO) responded affirmatively to the target question (consistent across both 
instances). However, when asked if two people sleeping in the same room always 
dreamed about the same thing, responded, “people don’t always dream about the 
same thing,” and “only one day they can dream about the same thing.” 
LL (3;lO) “Maybe they like to, maybe they don’t.” 
HG (3;4) responded negatively to Question 1. Justification: “Cause she’s not 
sleeping in his bed to dream about it.” 
